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 Over the past 20 years, the science of DNA has put thousands of perpetrators 
behind bars and exonerated the innocent.  Without question, the advent of DNA 
databases has increased law enforcement’s ability to solve crimes.  Texas’ Combined 
DNA Index System (CODIS) is no exception and while it has experienced much 
success, Texans would be better served with the inclusion of all arrestees. This 
expansion would solve more crimes, eliminate ambiguity in the collection and 
submission process, and utilize the technological tool to its full potential.  Other 
countries and U.S. states that have implemented arrest based guidelines have 
experienced much success.  While most people accept DNA databases as an 
acceptable form of crime control, many object to sweeping collection laws due to 
perceived civil rights violations, oppressive cost, and practicability concerns.  However, 
after a critical analysis of these issues, the objective to expand CODIS to include all 
arrestees should remain the goal for all those concerned about the commission of crime 
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The creative manner in which people consistently break the law, especially in 
criminal cases, is matched only by the innovative means the law enforcement 
community has employed in the effort to identify, apprehend and punish the 
perpetrators.  Prior to the nineteenth century, law enforcement relied primarily on 
essential but nevertheless rudimentary methods of investigation such as eyewitness 
accounts and witness interviews (Lyman, 2001).  However, by the end of the nineteenth 
century the scientific community introduced the concept of individuality and identification 
through fingerprint collection and comparison (Gaensslen, 2009).  For over one hundred 
years the science of fingerprints was considered by many as the single greatest 
development in the fight against crime. With the dawn of the Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) database, the ability to identify criminals through their 
fingerprints increased exponentially (Fisher, 2004).  Currently, anyone arrested in 
Texas, is typically fingerprinted during the booking process.  Those representative prints 
are then entered and stored into AFIS.  When a crime is committed and latent or 
unidentified fingerprints are recovered, suitable latents can be submitted to AFIS and 
compared to all offender prints on file.  This process occurs routinely in all fifty states 
and nationally through the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) (Gaensslen, 2009).  Today, similarities can be 
drawn between the development and utilization of forensic fingerprint analysis and the 
implementation of forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiling, commonly referred to 
as DNA fingerprinting (Tracey & Morgan, 2000). 
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As with fingerprints, the collection, analysis, and comparison of DNA profiles in 
criminal cases has progressed in recent years to be a universally applied and legally 
admissible form of crime control.  In fact, many believe DNA analysis to be the greatest 
form of forensic identification ever developed, surpassing even the reliability of 
fingerprint identification (Aronson, 2007).  In fact, over the past ten years, DNA has 
become increasingly referred to as the “the new fingerprinting” and a “kind of truth 
machine” (Genge, 2002, p. 57; Lynch, McNally, & Jordan, 2008, xvii). The formation of 
legislatively mandated DNA databases such as the FBI’s National Combined DNA Index 
System (NDIS), in conjunction with Texas’ Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), 
have protracted the ability of law enforcement personnel in all 50 states to identify 
perpetrators and even link them to offenses perhaps to which they had not previously 
been recognized as suspects (“DNA forensics and the law,” 2007; FBI, 2009).  While 
the United States and Texas have experienced much success with CODIS, primarily 
only the DNA profiles of convicted felons are entered into the offender database in 
Texas, and forwarded to National CODIS (NDIS) (Texas DPS, 2009; Linacre, 2003).  In 
2008, Texas CODIS was minimally supplemented with post indictment arrestees of 
some sexual offenses (National Conference, 2009).  Due to the flaws in that design, 
CODIS is limited in its ability to assist law enforcement agencies with investigating and 
prosecuting criminal cases in which biological evidence is collected (Fisher, 2004).  
The positive effect of Texas CODIS can be enhanced by modifying the 
requirements for the collection of DNA samples and increasing the number of offender 
profiles stored in the database.  History has shown an increase in identifications as 
more profiles are processed.  In 2007, the Texas Department of Public Safety 
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celebrated their 1,000th CODIS match (“DNA database cracks 1,000th case,” 2007).  
Five years later, and after analyzing approximately 660,000 DNA samples, the Texas 
Department of Public Safety proudly announced that the crime lab had identified 
suspects in 10,000 open crime investigations through CODIS (Chammah, 2012).   
Additionally, with the advances in DNA technology and the advent of touch DNA, 
more and more questioned profiles are entered into CODIS for non-sex related and 
non-violent offenses.  In fact, many crime scene investigators and laboratory analysts 
swab items of evidentiary value for DNA found in sloughed skin cells (Department of 
Justice, 2004).  Countries, such as the United Kingdom and Wales, along with the 
fifteen States in the U.S. that have implemented arrest based guidelines for the 
collection of known DNA samples have experienced great success in clearing crimes 
(Neil, 2008).  Texas CODIS is not only limited by the lack of offenders in the database 
but also by the failure of professionals to obtain known samples from offenders who 
qualify for submission into CODIS (Fisher, 2004).  Therefore, Texas statute should 
mandate the collection of DNA samples from every individual arrested in Texas for any 
offense, which theoretically, upon conviction, would be punishable with jail time (Class B 
or higher).  The collection of DNA from arrestees as a matter of practice during the 
booking procedure will increase law enforcement’s ability to fight crime, remove current 
ambiguities from the process and utilize CODIS to its full potential.  Of course, with any 
pre-conviction or comprehensive collection law, issues arise such as perceived civil 
rights violations, financial or resource implications and “practicability” (a term coined by 
Peter Martin) concerns.  Ultimately, though, the potential benefits of comprehensive 
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collection of DNA are immeasurable.  Every entry into CODIS increases the probability 
that a crime will be solved. 
POSITION 
In 1989, Virginia became the first state to develop a DNA database for retaining 
the genetic material of convicted felons (Grimm, 2007).  The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Laboratory followed suit in 1990 with a pilot project serving only fourteen 
state and local laboratories.  The National DNA Identification Act of 1994 authorized the 
FBI to establish a National DNA Index System (NDIS) for law enforcement purposes 
(CODIS, 2012).  The state of Texas followed for certain convicted felons in 1995 under 
the authority of House Bill 40 (Texas DPS, Special Projects, n.d.).  As such, Texas 
CODIS was born, and became a participating partner of the National program (NDIS) 
(Texas DPS, 2009). Currently, all fifty states utilize DNA databanks, are linked to one 
another through NDIS, and therefore permit comparisons between states (FBI, CODIS, 
n.d.; Linacre, 2003).  Texas CODIS contains DNA profiles from offenders, crime scenes, 
missing persons, unidentified human remains, biological relatives of missing persons 
and suspect elimination samples; however, this paper will deal primarily with the 
offender portion, which is by far the most populated section of the database (CODIS, 
2012). 
Texas State Law currently mandates the collection of biological samples, usually 
in the form of buccal (mouth) swabs, from all convicted felons and a few post indictment 
arrestees.  The list of eligible offenders is posted on line under DNA Sample Collection 
by the Texas Department of Public Safety (Texas DPS, DNA Sample Collection, n.d.).  
By its very design, the process can leave many qualifying profiles falling by the wayside 
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if the appropriate personnel do not follow through with obtaining a sample upon 
conviction.  Title 37, Chapter 28, Subchapter E of the Texas Administrative Code 
requires community supervision personnel to collect swabs from felons who are 
sentenced to probation as opposed to prison time (Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 
28.81).  However, there are no sanctions imposed on those who do not obtain samples 
from qualifying individuals, or for those who do not do so in a timely manner (Texas 
Administrative Code, Chapter 28).  In fact, the Texas Department of Corrections is not 
required to obtain a sample from a qualifying inmate prior to his release to the public.  If 
a felon is released from prison without providing a sample for CODIS, it is up to the 
discretion of the Director of TDCJ to attempt to obtain a sample post release (Texas 
Administrative Code, Chapter 28.41).  
Another hindrance to the prompt submission of felons’ samples into CODIS is the 
length of time it may take for cases to be adjudicated.  In Texas, it can be years before 
a felony case goes to trial, even after the individual has been arrested and charged by 
indictment (“Judge delays,” 2012; Worchel, 2012; Cowling, 2004).  Recently, officials in 
Brazos County have acknowledged an inability to move cases faster through the judicial 
process as well (Kiely, 2011).  Therefore, obtaining DNA samples from everyone upon 
arrest, contemporaneous to fingerprinting, will eliminate any ambiguity in the collection 
process and also ensure a prompt submission of offender samples to CODIS.  
Currently, there is very little uniformity in how or when samples are collected from those 
convicted of felonies in Texas (Texas DPS, 2012; Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 
28). 
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Law enforcement has utilized DNA data banks to help solve crimes for over 
twenty years.  In Texas, the collection of DNA from all arrestees will enable police to 
solve more crimes, especially in cases where only DNA evidence is recovered.  
Additionally, a criminal who is arrested for one crime may be linked to other crimes 
(Tracey & Morgan, 2001).  Considering the fact that CODIS logged their 1,000th hit in 
2007, their 8,000th hit in 2011, and their 10,000th hit in 2012, it is clear that as samples 
are uploaded, more cases are solved (Molina, 2012; Chammah, 2012).  Thus, the 
second argument in favor of expanding CODIS is simple to articulate.  The more 
samples in the database, the greater the chance of a match (Rothstein & Carnahan, 
2001).  In conjunction with more crimes being solved, more individuals will be 
exonerated or eliminated as suspects (National Conference, 2009).  As law 
enforcement advocate Linda Spagnoli argues, “DNA testing has become critical in 
exonerating the innocent.  The true power of DNA, like that of fingerprints, is its ability to 
positively identify an individual.  That provides real confidence” (Spagnoli, 2007, p. 2).  
So, the creation of a stronger, more encompassing DNA database will continue to 
identify criminals and clear the innocent without them “ever having to step into the 
courtroom” (Aronson, 2007, p. 209).  Many perpetrators plead guilty in the face of such 
powerful evidence, and according to the Innocence Project, more than 240 people have 
been exonerated through DNA testing alone (Aronson, 2007; The Innocence Project, 
2011).   
Additionally, with the emergence of touch DNA, more unidentified samples are 
being collected from crime scenes and the potential for solving even non-violent crimes 
has dramatically increased.  A perpetrator does not have to physically attack anyone to 
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leave their DNA behind; therefore, investigators are no longer just searching for blood, 
hair and semen (United States Department of Justice, 2004).  As the manner and ease 
in which law enforcement obtains unknown samples evolves, so should the database. 
Offered as a third point for expansion, is the responsibility of Texas law 
enforcement to evolve and learn from those who have already expanded their DNA data 
banks.  Several countries, the federal government and other states have experienced 
much success after do so.  Texans should feel secure knowing that such a powerful tool 
is being utilized to its full potential. 
It is no secret that DNA analysis in the United States is patterned after the work 
of the United Kingdom’s Sir Alec Jeffreys (Linacre, 2003).  In the UK version of CODIS, 
known as the National DNA Database (NDNAD), police are instructed to take DNA 
samples without consent from anyone arrested in connection with any recordable 
offense.  All DNA samples are kept permanently by the companies that analyze them 
regardless of whether the individual is ever charged, convicted or acquitted of the crime 
(Wallace, 2006).  In the UK, “every week their National DNA database matches over 
1,000 DNA profiles taken from crime scenes with names on the database.  Around 42 
percent of those matches are turned into detections within an average of fourteen days.  
That is a huge achievement” (“DNA database will top,” 2012, p.1).  England has been 
able to analyze DNA samples from arrestees and suspects within five days, even after 
including all arrestees into the permissible population group (“DNA database will top,” 
2012, p. 1).  In fact, the United States government recently expanded NDIS by 
collecting “DNA samples from illegal immigrants picked up by federal authorities and 
from all people arrested for federal offenses” (Samalin, 2008, p. 1).   
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Several U.S. states including Florida, Maryland and California have expanded 
their databases to include more arrestees, who submit to a DNA sample at the time of 
booking.  Scott Thorpe, a spokesman for the California District Attorney’s Association, 
cited much success with California CODIS in identifying perpetrators after the passing 
of Proposition 69 (Simoncelli & Steinhardt, 2005; Thorpe, 2010).  In November of 2004, 
California voters passed The DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence 
Protection Act by a margin of sixty to forty percent. The new law expanded the DNA 
database in California to include samples from all felons and individuals with past felony 
convictions, including juveniles.  Additionally, in 2009 the bill will expand California 
CODIS to include all adults arrested for any felonies (Simoncelli & Steinhardt, 2006).  In 
2008, Texas Legislators passed SB 727, which expanded CODIS, but only 
encompassing convicted felons (Russell, 2009).  Officials have expressed support for 
California and the feds, often comparing it to the expansion of fingerprinting. “It saves 
women’s lives,” said Denver Colorado’s district attorney, who has “watched women go 
from mug book to mug book looking for the man who raped her” (Colgrass, 2009, p. 1).  
Subjecting all arrestees to submit DNA samples is the current outer limit of DNA 
databases.  Once Texas mandates this expansion, the State will have done all it can to 
ensure that CODIS is being utilized to its full potential.  Because all statewide databases 
are linked to one another through NDIS, the mandate will help solve more crimes across 
the nation. 
While most people have come to accept CODIS as an acceptable crime fighting 
tool, some vehemently protest any proposed expansion that goes beyond convicted 
felons.  The prospect of including any arrestees, much less all arrestees, sparks much 
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debate, usually on constitutional grounds, cost concerns and practicability issues.  In 
order to successfully argue the expansion of CODIS, these three issues must be 
carefully examined.   
COUNTER POSITION 
Most opponents of expanding DNA databases across the country protest the 
inclusion of arrestees on constitutional grounds, primarily what they consider to be 
violations of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.  Conflict exists 
between law enforcement’s aspirations to fully exploit the power of DNA to solve crimes 
while still protecting individual civil liberties, creating a fragile balance between “two 
alternative goods: the effective use of DNA for the identification of offenders on one side 
and the protection of individual rights to privacy on the other” (Williams & Johnson, 
2004, p. 208).  Many lawyers have argued that while expanding DNA databases will 
likely solve more crimes, they will erode civil liberties in the process (Rothstein and 
Carnahan, 2001).  The fourth amendment reads in part: “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause…” (Amar & 
Adams, 2002, p. 105-106). 
This amendment has been the United States Supreme Court’s basis for ruling 
that involuntary intrusion into the body constitutes a search.  Additionally, lower courts 
have agreed with the United States Supreme Court that the collection of DNA, even in 
the form of oral swabs, from offenders, is a search (DNA Forensics, 2007).  Not only is 
the search considered warrantless, many feel it is unreasonable as well (Rothstein & 
Carnahan, 2001). 
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Besides the obvious objections due to the involuntary nature of its collection, 
sweeping DNA laws raise other constitutional concerns.   For example, many people 
fear that the law could be abused by the police, who will begin to arrest people just to 
procure a sample, with or without probable cause (Human Genome Information, 2008). 
Additional civil rights issues, including privacy concerns, are raised by the 
government’s retention of the biological material from which the DNA profile was 
derived.  An argument exists that the government may misuse these samples, 
especially in states that do not destroy them after processing.  For example the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), affirms that the “criminal justice system 
recognizes that an individual is innocent until proven guilty” (ACLU, 2009, p. 2).  
Therefore, any effort to permanently store “DNA samples from people not yet convicted 
of a crime violates their privacy” (ACLU, 2009, p. 2).  Accordingly, the ACLU objects to 
the “over collection and storage of DNA on constitutional grounds” (ACLU, 2009, p. 1).   
James Starrs, a George Washington University professor and Fellow of the 
Academy of Forensic Sciences warned of the expansion of DNA databases by arguing 
that the Constitution should not be ignored simply because the DNA analysis serves a 
government purpose (Tracey & Morgan, 2000).  Legal experts opposed on these 
grounds consider DNA profiles different from fingerprints constitutionally because, while 
fingerprints are useful only for identification, DNA can provide other information (Human 
Genome Information, 2008).  Many states, including Texas, do not mandate that 
samples be destroyed after the profile is entered into CODIS.  In fact, with very few 
exceptions, Texas retains the samples permanently, according to Gary Molina (personal 
communication, February 1, 2012), the Texas Department of Public Safety CODIS 
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Director.  There are those who fear that DNA databanks will expose “who I am, my 
biological potential, my health situation, my paternity, my race and most profound 
personal secrets” (Kaye, Constitutionality, 2001a).  People fear that keeping samples 
potentially places them under a lifetime of genetic surveillance (O’Neil, 2008).   
R.E. Gaensslen, a Professor of Graduate Studies for Forensic Science at the 
University of Illinois, also worries about specimen retention due to rapidly developing 
new technologies that will allow the government to discover health or disease related 
information from samples.  So far, labs only extract DNA information for identification 
purposes.  The fear, however, is that labs will turn samples over to another group for 
examination or begin those studies themselves (Gaensslen, 2006; Axelrad, 2004). 
Essentially, those opposed to sweeping collection of DNA on constitutional 
grounds feel that the collection of buccal swabs from all arrestees is a violation of the 
search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment; also that the permanent retention 
of the biological samples threatens their privacy and subjects them to a lifetime of 
potential genetic scrutiny or surveillance.  They also identify violations of the 
fundamental premise of the presumption of innocence (Lynch et al., 2008).  There is 
also the potential to arrest people with less than probable cause, just to obtain a DNA 
sample for the databank (Human Genome Information, 2008). 
Proponents of the expansion of DNA databanks argue that the sweeping 
collection of DNA is not in violation of the fourth amendment, nor does it undermine the 
presumption of innocence, for a variety of reasons.  Additionally, many feel that the 
permanent retention of biological samples protects the civil rights of both the guilty and 
the innocent.  For instance, while the Supreme Court considers involuntary procurement 
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of a biological sample a under the fourth amendment, they consistently “rejected fourth 
amendment challenges to these searches for law enforcement use on one of two 
grounds” (“DNA forensics,” 2007, p. 2).  First, the Court determined that perpetrators 
have less of an expectation of privacy, simply because they are offenders.  Second, 
they determined that law enforcement has a special need to efficiently investigate crime 
and that need is greater than someone’s privacy interest in not being included in the 
database (“DNA forensics,” 2007).  This analysis is often referred to as a “balancing 
test” whereas the Supreme Court weighs the level of intrusion against the government’s 
interest (Rothstein & Carnahan, 2001).   
Another consideration is that with developing technology, the physical intrusions 
required in collecting DNA continue to decrease while the governmental interest 
remains the same.  Inevitably, expansion of DNA testing for crime fighters will continue 
to be upheld (Rothstein & Carnahan, 2001).  In State v. Olivas, a case which upheld a 
Washington DNA testing statue, the United States Supreme Court stated that the 
“purpose of the DNA data bank was to deter and prosecute recidivist acts, and that this 
purpose was a special need of government beyond law enforcement” (Rothstein & 
Carnahan, 2001, p. 6).  It is clear that while the Supreme Court is leery of permitting 
DNA collection of everyone, that argument does not apply to people suspected of 
crimes, such as arrestees (Alfano, 2006).  State courts are also following the United 
States Supreme Court’s lead, such as in Anderson v. Commonwealth, a 2007 case in 
which the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that collection of DNA from an arrestee did not 
violate the fourth amendment and the statute was constitutional (“DNA arrestee 
database cases,” 2012).   
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There are legal experts, including Prosecutor Ted Wilson, formerly of the Harris 
County District Attorney’s Office, who go so far as to claim that the collection of buccal 
swabs “is not a search under the fourth amendment to the Constitution requiring 
issuance of a Search Warrant” (Wilson, 2011, p. 2).  Other prosecutors indicate that the 
fourth amendment does not prohibit government searches without a warrant.  The 
amendment forbids searches that are deemed unreasonable (Rothstein & Carnahan, 
2001).  Collecting buccal swabs is far less invasive than drawing blood, and therefore 
minimizes legal challenges (Rothstein & Carnahan, 2001).  Therefore, to many, 
objections have little validity in such circumstances (Kaye, Constitutionality,  2001a).   
A great deal of modern civil rights law is also based on the opinion issued in Katz 
v. United States.  The considerations made to determine if the seizure was lawful in that 
case were one, the extent to which the material was displayed to the public, or the 
expectation of privacy with the item seized, two, the extent of the bodily invasion caused 
by the sampling, and three, the nature of the information that could be extracted from 
the sample (Kaye, Constitutionality, 2001a).  The extent of the bodily invasion is minimal 
considering the requirements in obtaining a buccal swab, material that can be obtained 
off a discarded cup or licked envelope.  Judge Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicated, as the “techniques for extracting 
DNA improve and identifying information can more easily be obtained from urine and 
saliva, or from hair follicles inadvertently pulled out during a visit to the barber or 
hairdresser…we have no legitimate expectation of privacy” (Alfano, 2006, p.7).  
Therefore, “there is no issue then with the government collecting what we leave behind 
and extracting the DNA profile” (Alfano, 2006, p. 7).   
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Regarding the final analysis in Katz, while the nature of the information that can 
be extracted from the sample is great, the Texas Administrative Code, Texas 
Government Code and Texas Penal Code all prohibit the misuse of the information 
(Texas Administrative Code, 2011; Texas Government Code, 2011; TDCAA Criminal 
Laws, 2011).  For example, the Texas Government Code states that CODIS information 
can only be used for identification purposes.  Biological samples from offenders can 
only be typed by the Texas Department of Public Safety Lab and the resulting DNA 
profiles can only be uploaded from the DPS Austin Lab.  Chapter 411.143 of the Texas 
Government Code sets out that the principal purpose of the database is to assist in the 
investigation of an offense, the exclusion or identification of suspects and the 
prosecution of a case (Tracey & Morgan, 2000).   
The Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety is the liaison for DNA 
data, records, evidence, and other related matters between the FBI and DNA 
laboratories or criminal justice/law enforcement agencies.  Additionally, a person 
commits a criminal offense if the person reveals information in a DNA record or 
information related to a DNA analysis of a sample collected for CODIS.  A “DNA record 
stored in the DNA database is confidential and is not subject to disclosure under the 
open records law” (Tracey and Morgan, 2000, p. 680).  An offense under this section is 
Official Misconduct, a State Jail Felony (Texas DPS, Frequently asked questions, n.d.).  
Former Texas Attorney General John Cornyn addressed these concerns in an official 
opinion issued in 2001, in which he quoted Chapter 411.153 of the Government Code, 
subchapter G, confirming that a DNA record in CODIS is not open to the public (Office 
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of the Texas Attorney General, 2001).  Therefore, not only is the offender or arrestee’s 
name protected, but so is their genetic privacy.    
While local regulations are a strong deterrent to the abuse of the samples, there 
are also federal laws prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of DNA information, with 
fines as high as 100 thousand dollars for each offense (Tracey & Morgan, 2000; Leahy, 
2004).  In Title IV of The Innocence Protection Act of 2004, criminal provisions already 
in existence were modified to augment the threat of prosecution for illegal distribution of 
protected DNA information (Leahy, 2004).  So, the threat that the government will use 
the DNA sample for something other than obtaining the STR profile for criminal case 
investigation is unfounded. 
Something often neglected by civil libertarians is the fact that in Texas CODIS, 
sample retention protects those profiled in the case of a hit.  Many researchers suggest 
that while the public may have a fear of potential abuse, there is no legitimate threat to 
citizens’ privacy (Kaye, Fallacies, 2001b).  According to CODIS Director Gary Molina 
(personal communication, February 1, 2012), when someone is identified in CODIS, a 
portion of their original biological sample is tested again to confirm the hit.  Then the law 
enforcement agency is notified of the tentative identification so that they can obtain 
another sample from the offender, via a search warrant.  Failure to retain biological 
samples would not allow the labs to pull an original sample and ensure that the profile 
was entered into CODIS.  As an example, in 2007, in Boston, Massachusetts, an 
administrator at the State Police Crime Laboratory mishandled DNA test results in 
twenty seven sexual assault cases.  The ability to pull what remained of the original 
samples was crucial to correcting the problem (Saltzman, 2007).  There may come a 
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time when Texas follows Wisconsin, a state that requires DNA samples collected in 
state databanks be destroyed following profiling (Kimmelman, 2000).  Currently, though, 
Texas law mandates the retention of samples to protect its donors, best illustrated in 
Massachusetts at their state lab (“DNA database,” 2007). 
Regarding sample retention complaints, Texas, along with Louisiana, Virginia 
and New York, require that arrestee’s and suspects’ DNA information be purged upon 
acquittal, exoneration or dismissal of the charges.  This includes destruction of the 
biological sample and data entered into the bank (Axelrad, 2004).  The federal DNA 
Identification Act also governs the federal CODIS system regarding the submission and 
retention of samples from participating states.  It too requires expungement of 
information if a conviction was overturned, or in the case of an arrestee, if there was no 
conviction, the charges were dismissed or the person was acquitted (Axelrad, 2004).  
The destruction of samples in those circumstances satisfies many civil libertarians on 
the issue of constitutional protection (Harlan, 2004). 
A similar option was proposed by law professors from Cornell University, who 
stated, “If the DNA is obtained in a non-invasive manner and if information related to 
identification and nothing else could be obtained from it, the analogy to fingerprinting 
would be complete.”  For example, if in the future, the police are equipped with a DNA 
kit that analyzes certain loci (markers), and the sample is destroyed once the data is 
recorded, then to many, this would not be considered a search (Kaye, Constitutionality, 
2001a, p. 10). 
There is a solution that would please both those opposed to sample retention 
and those arguing the need for it.  This measure involves the establishment of a “gene 
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trustee” between the offenders or person submitting a DNA sample and the government 
authority maintaining the database.  If the police “analyze a sample in the DNA 
database and have a valid and legal reason to know the identity of the donor, the gene 
trustee provides this information to them.”  If the gene trustee does not deem the 
release of the name or information legal or probative, based upon a series of 
requirements, they can make the database useless in that circumstance (Burnet, 2003, 
p. 1).  A similar alternative that will protect the rights of those with samples maintained 
in databases was proposed by Francisco Corte-Real in 2004.  In order to prevent the 
unacceptable use of the samples, the profile can be codified and established in a 
separate register.  Then, in only certain occasions (by court order for instance), would a 
search be made (Corte-Real, 2004).  While they may be ingenious and interesting, 
these alternatives are not necessary in Texas, considering the laws already in place to 
protect the rights of people who find their profiles entered into CODIS.   
Another point, often neglected by civil libertarians opposed to expanding CODIS 
is the potential to clear the innocent of wrongdoing.  The federal government has 
become so concerned with using CODIS to exonerate the innocent that they passed the 
Innocence Protection Act of 2004, which establishes rules and procedures governing 
applications for DNA testing by inmates in the federal system.  Under this law, the 
government authorizes over five million dollars a year in grants to help states cover the 
cost of post conviction DNA testing (Leahy, 2004). 
Finally, in opposition of expanding DNA databases to include arrestees, civil 
libertarians claim that there is a potential for officers to arrest individuals with less than 
probable cause, just to procure a DNA sample.  In Texas, as previously addressed, 
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samples from suspects who are acquitted or exonerated are expunged from the 
database (Axelrad, 2004).  Additionally, investigators are prohibited from using any 
evidence wrongfully obtained as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” thereby eliminating the 
possibility of introducing any physical evidence in court that was illegally obtained.  Any 
arrest that is deemed unconstitutional or made without sufficient probable cause will 
result in the suppression of the suspect’s DNA sample which was collected pursuant to 
that arrest (TDCAA Criminal Laws, 2011).  The proposal of this paper is not to include 
the entire population in CODIS, but all those individuals who are arrested, based upon 
probable cause, as required by law.  Considering the ease with which DNA samples can 
be obtained surreptitiously, there is no need for law enforcement personnel to arrest 
anyone with less than probable cause. 
In the final analysis, potential civil rights violations are no longer an issue for 
forensic scientists like Rick Staub (personal communication, February 10, 2012), 
Laboratory Director of Orchid Cellmark, a private DNA testing lab based in Dallas, 
Texas.   According to Staub, because there is no longer a potential of a fortuitous 
match, no one should be opposed to having their DNA profile entered into the database 
upon arrest.  Current quality control measures, peer review, FBI audits and confirmed 
population statistics ensure that there will be no false matches in CODIS.  In a nutshell, 
“if you have done nothing wrong, you have nothing to fear” (Colgrass, 2009, p. 2). 
While civil rights activists occupy much of the debate on the topic of sweeping 
DNA collection, other factors such as cost and practicability are hotly contested as well. 
Despite its proven value, expanding DNA analysis to property crimes or misdemeanors 
is costly (United States Department of Justice, 2004).  The National Commission on the 
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Future of DNA Evidence has predicted that it would cost New York City alone an 
estimated 18.5 million dollars a year to process samples from all those arrested.  If this 
were expanded nationally, it could result in about 15 million additional tests per year. 
When multiplied by “the cost of each test, this additional expense would come to some 
765 million dollars annually” (Tracey & Morgan, 2000, p. 665). 
CODIS director Gary Molina (personal communication, October 29, 2011) 
indicated that expanding the DNA database to cover all arrestees would be cost 
prohibitive if DNA is collected and analyzed in the current manner.  By his accounts, 
DPS would have to hire one hundred additional DNA analysts and build another large 
building just to process the samples for entry.  During the past legislative session in 
Texas, House Bill 1536, authored by Representative Craig Eiland, proposed the 
expansion of CODIS to include anyone arrested for any offense punishable as a Class 
B misdemeanor or higher.  The Act was set to take effect on September 1, 2011 
(Eiland, 2011). The bill did not pass because, according to Molina (personal 
communication, October 29, 2011), the cost to DPS was too great.  The DPS crime lab, 
like those in many other states, lacks sufficient numbers of trained forensic scientists 
and the funds to hire more staff (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006).   
While CODIS Director Gary Molina (personal communication, October 29, 2011) 
is leery of expanding the database, there is a difference of opinion at DPS.  One DNA 
crime lab technician who was interviewed would like to see all arrests included (Tracey 
& Morgan, 2000).  According to Peter Martin, the future will brighten as technology 
advances in the field of DNA science.  The cost will be defrayed as it becomes quicker 
and easier to obtain a profile from an individual (Martin, 2004). 
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There are several possibilities that could defray the cost for the Texas 
Department of Public Safety.  For instance, state or local governments could add the 
fee of processing a sample to arrestee fines and penalties that are associated with 
probation, or court costs in minor offenses.  Additionally, the law could be changed such 
that other licensed and certified labs across the state assist DPS with housing and 
processing offender samples.  If private labs or other government labs processed 
offender samples by region of arrest, costs would be cut dramatically for DPS and the 
number of necessary hirings would be reduced.  Outside, private labs, could submit 
offender profiles to CODIS, just as the other DPS crime labs do currently.  With the 
support from the National Institute of Justice, some U.S. crime labs were able to 
overcome issues by sending DNA samples to private labs for analysis (Zedlewski & 
Murphy, 2006).  The Texas Department of Public Safety could also petition the Texas 
Legislature for additional funding once CODIS is expanded. 
A recent development in forensic DNA may revolutionize the science and have 
the greatest effect on reducing the cost of collecting, storing and analyzing samples for 
CODIS.  Today, DNA profiling, which entails the identification of thirteen genetic 
markers or loci (STR) in an individual’s genetic code, or nuclear DNA, is an extensive 
lab procedure and unavoidably costly.  The FBI is preparing to release a portable kit, 
known as Rapid DNA, which will be capable of analyzing human DNA in about forty five 
minutes (Messmer, 2010).  As one can imagine, Rapid DNA kits, which authorized 
personnel could carry in the field or use at booking stations, will drastically cut the cost 
for DPS.  Dr. James Landers, a chemist and Chief Scientific Officer at MicroLab, claims 
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that Rapid DNA or RDNA is feasible and within the grasp of the scientific community 
(Messmer, 2010).  
While cost cutting technology is not quite within reach, currently there are 
multiple federal grants available to assist in defraying the cost of operating CODIS.  
Assuming that CODIS is expanded to include all arrestees, this funding will continue 
and can be petitioned to increase (President’s DNA Initiative, 2007a).  Many of these 
grants will remain available, even in light of the current economic crisis facing the 
federal government (Nelson, 2011). Former US Attorney General Janet Reno was so 
impressed with the results of the grants used to defray costs under the National Institute 
of Justice that she directed the NIJ to establish a national commission of the future of 
DNA evidence (Tracey & Morgan, 2000).  Some of the federal funding to cut costs of 
CODIS labs in Texas and across the nation is provided by the Justice For All Act of 
2004, which authorized 255 million dollars to promote the use of DNA technology on a 
variety of levels (Leahy, 2004).  The Texas Department of Public Safety has been 
receiving federal funds to enhance DNA examination and CODIS since 1996.  Also, the 
latest advances in forensic DNA analyses are employed to provide the greatest 
statistical probability of a match at reasonable costs.  DNA profile information is already 
being sent from DPS field laboratories to the CODIS laboratory in Austin for database 
searches, reducing the cost of entering samples into the database (Texas DPS, 2008).  
Considerations should be made to allow other labs to do the same.  Most recently, other 
states have used federal funds to purchase automated work stations, hire personnel, 
outsource testing and validate more efficient procedures (Nelson, 2011). 
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Even without the development of RDNA, the cost of DNA analysis must be 
weighed against the financial and emotional losses incurred by the public.  Researchers 
with the National Institute of Justice suggest, “It is much more expeditious to employ 
DNA testing than to pay investigators” (United States Department of Justice, 2004). 
Opponents of expansion should also consider the cost of continuing to investigate 
offenses, the generation of paperwork, and overtime, when it is possible that the crime 
could have been solved if the perpetrator was in CODIS.  As an example: 
In March of 2004, Langimaa Faulalo was arrested for the murder of Danny 
Johnson in Sacramento, California.  The arrest occurred before the passing of 
Proposition 69, which included all those arrested on felony charges.  Faulalo’s case did 
not go to trial until March of 2007.  Faulalo was convicted and his profile was submitted 
to California CODIS.  During that three year period, investigators in Sacramento 
continued to work the unsolved murder of a victim named Eddie Heyderagha. Soon 
after Faulalo’s profile was entered into CODIS there was a hit against blood evidence 
collected at the Heyderagha scene.  Faulalo was thereby identified in that murder case 
as well.  Had Faulalo’s profile been entered into CODIS at the time of his arrest, the 
county of Sacramento would have saved countless man hours of investigation and other 
costly resources (Thorpe, 2010).  Additionally, Heyderagha’s family and friends would 
not have spent three years bemoaning an arrest in the case.  
When examining the cost, one should also consider the likelihood that someone 
may plead guilty once they are confronted with incontrovertible DNA evidence rather 
than take the case to trial.  It is much more cost effective to process a sample from an 
arrestee, than it is to fund the investigation to identify him, and a trial which may or may 
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not result in a conviction.  In the final analysis, it is also hard to put a price on enhancing 
the public safety.  Regardless, the advent of Rapid DNA kits would alleviate cost 
obstacles in the future, according to the FBI (Messmer, 2010). 
The final issue typically raised when proposing an expansion of the DNA data 
banks is practicability, a term coined by Peter Martin.  Many opponents claim that 
including all arrestees in CODIS is practically impossible.  Assuming funds are available 
for the expansion of DPS to build another CODIS building and hire additional analysts, 
there may be an insufficient number of qualified forensic scientists to hire to handle the 
increase in submission samples (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006).  In addition to not having 
enough trained analysts, Gary Molina (personal communication, October 29, 2011) 
indicated that the current backlog of profiles to be entered from felons and indicted 
offenders could prevent the inclusion of all arrestees in a timely manner.  Molina also 
expressed fears in how and where the samples would be collected for submission to the 
laboratory.       
Recent years have “witnessed a backlog of DNA data from known offenders 
waiting to be input into searchable databases.” In fact many samples have not even 
been collected from eligible offenders, much less analyzed (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006, 
p. 2). The backlog of samples awaiting testing throughout the criminal justice system 
increased dramatically over the past five years (Human Genome Information, 2009).  In 
fact, in 2008 the US Justice Department found that while backlogs are rising, many 
states continue to pass legislation that expands the databases.  According to the 
American Civil Liberties Union, it is comparable to “tossing more hay onto a pile while 
still searching for the needle” (ACLU, 2009, p. 1).  The backlog issue became a huge 
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concern after Former Attorney General Janet Reno requested an analysis of the 
constitutionality of obtaining DNA samples from arrestees.  The final ruling on this issue 
was placed on hold due to the significant backlog of current samples for eligible 
offenders (Rothstein & Carnahan, 2001). 
Regarding the lack of qualified analysts to hire, assuming the expansion of 
CODIS occurs; one must look at the possibility again of going outside The Texas 
Department of Public Safety for the analysis of suspect samples.  If a lab is ASCLD 
(American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors) certified and their analysts go through 
the routine rigors of peer review and quality assurance, then they are amply qualified to 
submit offender profiles to CODIS.  Chapter 411 of the Government Code would need 
to be amended, allowing private labs to analyze arrestee samples and submit those 
profiles to DPS.    
As with the cost issue, the farming out of DNA processing to private labs, by 
region of the arrestees residence or county, will help to alleviate the backlog problem as 
well.  CODIS acceptable profiles are those that meet the standards established by the 
NDIS.  If a lab is ASCLD certified, then they are able to follow the technical 
requirements of such processing (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006). 
It should also be noted that substantial federal funding is available to help 
eliminate backlogs and encourage aggressive programs to collect owed samples from 
convicted offenders (Zedlewski & Murphy, 2006).  Many states have availed themselves 
of this subsidy.  As examples, several funding options will be detailed. 
In 2003, Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act. This Act 
apportioned millions of dollars to the U.S. Department of Justice for DNA activities.   
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Among other things, it authorized the Attorney General to make grants to increase the 
capacity of laboratories to analyze samples taken from convicted offenders and crime 
scenes (Human Genome Information, 2009). 
The Justice for All Act of 2004 authorized $755 million dollars to address the 
DNA backlog crisis in the nation’s crime labs (Leahy, 2004).  From 2005 to 2008, the 
Texas Department of Public Safety received almost six million dollars in additional 
funding to assist with backlog reduction from the President’s DNA Initiative (President’s 
DNA Initiative, 2007b).  In 2012, DPS is scheduled to receive well over three million for 
the same purpose. They will also receive nearly half a million dollars from the Coverdell 
Forensic Services Grant (Texas Comptroller, 2008 and 2010). 
Beginning in 2011, the National Institute of Justice combined the DNA Backlog 
Reduction Program with the Convicted Offender and/or Arrestee DNA Backlog 
Reduction Program into a single program called the DNA Backlog Reduction Program, 
which provides funding to the crime labs across the nation (President’s DNA Initiative, 
2011).  A critical point to remember when analyzing the practicability problem, namely 
the backlog of samples is this: the problem is transitory and solved through increased 
funding.  Also, as technology advances, analysts will be able to obtain a profile faster 
and more efficiently (Rothstein & Carnahan, 2001).  Moreover, the advent of Rapid DNA 
(RDNA) kits that enable a qualified individual to obtain a profile from a suspect or 
arrestee in less than an hour will resolve the backlog issue entirely, once DPS enters 
the profiles from those who submitted samples prior to the development of RDNA 
technology.   
Gary Molina (personal communication, October 29, 2011) also expressed 
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practicability concerns regarding the manner in which samples are collected.  Assuming 
all arrestees are eventually included in CODIS, the solution is quite simple.  After a 
suspect is arrested and brought to the jail, he or she is fingerprinted.  Buccal swabs will 
be collected at that time for submission to CODIS.  Currently, Texas DPS provides DNA 
Collection Kits free of charge (DPS, DNA Sample Collection, 2012).  Inked Fingerprints 
are collected from arrestees automatically.  Once booking officers begin obtaining 
buccal swabs at the same time, the process will become routine as well.  Once the 
RDNA kits are available, it will be even easier to acquire a profile and submit it to 
CODIS at the same time the prints are submitted to AFIS.  Collecting buccal swabs at 
booking, during every arrest is much simpler to implement than evaluating the 
admissibility of each arrest against the offender qualifications listed in Title 37, 
Subsection 28 of the Texas Administrative Code. 
Of all the solutions for cost and practicability impediments, RDNA kits may be the 
best answer to reducing costs and the backlog of samples.  Orchid Cellmark Lab 
Director Rick Staub (personal communication, February 10, 2012) believes that RDNA 
portable testing kits could alleviate the cost and practicability issues associated with 
sweeping DNA collection.  He indicated that the RDNA profiles will be generated as a 
thirteen loci profile, which is consistent with testing performed for entry into CODIS.  
There will be no compatibility issues in using RDNA kits at jails or in the field.  Staub 
also agreed that obtaining profiles upon arrest will bring much more uniformity to the 
collection of samples from offenders as opposed to assuming that someone will obtain 
buccals post conviction and submit them in a timely manner.  The potential of obtaining 
a profile in less than an hour from an offender and then submitting the digital profile to 
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CODIS is rapidly approaching.  The turnaround time for entering profiles into CODIS 
could result in a preliminary identification before a suspect has the opportunity to bond 
out of jail (Staub, personal communication, February 10, 2012).  
CONCLUSION 
After much debate and circumspection, it is clear that Texas should mandate the 
collection of DNA samples from every individual arrested in Texas for any offense, 
which theoretically, upon conviction, would be punishable with jail time (Class B or 
higher).  As stated earlier, the primary argument in favor of expanding the scope of 
CODIS is “compelling and easy to characterize. The more samples in the data bank, the 
greater the likelihood of a match or cold hit” (Rothstein & Carnahan, 2001, p.10).  In 
fact, the Texas Department of Public Safety indicated in December of 2012 that they 
had reached 10,000 “cold hits” or “unexpected” matches, when DNA profiles in the 
database were linked to submitted crime scene evidence (Chammah, 2012).  A majority 
of individuals identified as suspects were not in jail at the time the match was made 
(Chammah, 2012).  In conjunction with more crimes being solved, more individuals will 
be cleared of suspicion or exonerated completely (National Conference of State 
Legislators, 2009).  In opposition of expansion, people have cited civil rights concerns, 
cost considerations and practicability issues. 
Civil rights violations are no longer a legitimate concern in this matter, 
considering the manner in which DNA is collected and stored. The minimally intrusive 
nature of its collection and the expressed need by the government to protect its citizens 
essentially neutralizes the potential for fourth amendment abuse.  Furthermore, with no 
possibility of a false match, there is no risk for innocent people who find their profiles 
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entered in the database (Rick Staub, personal communication, February 10, 2012). In 
Texas, after a hit, the original sample is re-tested, followed by the issuance of a search 
warrant by the investigating officer, before any identification is made. So, no one is 
convicted of a crime from a CODIS submission exclusively.  Finally, and unfortunately 
for those opposed on civil grounds, courts have consistently ruled that DNA collection 
from arrestees is most analogous to fingerprinting and not unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment (Thorpe, 2010).  Beyond that, because CODIS is legally bound to 
use the biological samples only for the purpose intended, there is no real possibility of 
the abuse of the genetic data, whether the samples are permanently retained or not.    
Regarding cost and practicability issues, it has been shown that there are 
multiple methods for alleviating these concerns, including federal funding and perhaps 
amending portions of the Administrative Code to allow labs other than the Texas 
Department of Public Safety to analyze and submit offender samples to CODIS.  If 
private or government labs not affiliated with DPS are ASCLD certified, participate in the 
National DNA network and can be trusted to submit suspect or crime scene samples to 
CODIS, then they should be permitted to handle the legislatively mandated offender 
samples as well. 
Perhaps the most compelling and exciting development that may alleviate all cost 
and practicability concerns is the FBI’s development of Rapid DNA Kits (RDNA) which 
will allow investigators and jail staff to obtain a sample and generate a profile that is 
compatible with CODIS in less than an hour.  The potential benefit of this device for law 
enforcement and society as a whole is immeasurable.  Assuming RDNA kits are not 
provided to law enforcement immediately, then CODIS will continue to chip away at the 
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profile backlog through the assistance of federal funds.  Even when RDNA kits become 
available, they may not become widespread immediately.  In that case, perhaps Texas 
could follow the state of Maryland’s lead in expanding the database as backlogs are 
reduced.  For example in 2008, Maryland’s DNA backlog of over twenty four thousand 
cases was eliminated.   At that point, Governor O’Malley enacted SB 211, expanding 
their DNA database to include samples from persons arrested for crimes of violence, all 
burglaries and any attempt at those offenses. It is clear then that Maryland is striving to 
include more and more arrestees into the database as backlogs are reduced (Maryland 
Governor’s Office, 2010).  
It would serve those who are opposed to expansion on cost and practical 
grounds to remember that cost is relative.  According to Assistant Attorney General 
Ralph Guerrero (personal communication, February 11, 2012), a prosecutor with the 
Texas Attorney General, the cost of analyzing DNA and entering the profiles into CODIS 
is miniscule when compared to the cost of continuing an investigation, appropriating 
sufficient resources, paying overtime, and absorbing the overall cost of failing to bring 
criminals to justice and giving a measure of peace to victims and their families.  Tracey 
and Morgan stated that it would cost the nation about 765 million dollars to house 
profiles of all arrestees in DNA databases.  Some would suggest that the cost of 
investigating crimes and the emotional toll unsolved cases take on victims and their 
families far outweighs that consideration.  The cost of DNA testing “must be weighed 
against the losses from crime incurred by the public” (United States Department of 
Justice, 2004, p. 2).  In A Business Case for Using Forensic DNA Technology to Solve 
and Prevent Crime, Ray Wickenheiser formulated a powerful argument for the 
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expansion of DNA databases.  The author calculated the estimated cost of processing 
additional samples, for example from all arrestees, against annual and cumulative 
government spending to investigate and apprehend offenders, especially in serial 
sexual assault cases.  The estimated savings was 35.2 times the investment 
(Wickenheiser 2004).  Apprehending someone early in his/her criminal career not only 
saves money, it prevents others from becoming victimized by the same individual.  
It is much easier to calculate the financial loss by crime in Texas; the emotional 
tolls are not so easily quantified.  Perhaps the point of this paper is best argued by 
members of the California District Attorney’s Association; “DNA evidence is one of the 
greatest tools ever developed in the search for truth, the protection of society, conviction 
of the guilty, and exoneration of the innocent” (Thorpe, 2010, p. 16).  Victims of crime, 
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